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1 Introduction
Many terms may be used to describe the January
25th revolution, but perhaps the most apt
description is that it was a popular, civil revolution.
In other words, it was a revolution from below, yet
was neither populist nor anarchic. It involved
people from different social, educational and
religious backgrounds and superseded political,
ideological and intellectual distinctions. It was a
civil revolution because it successfully maintained
its peaceful nature until achieving its principal
goal: the ousting of President Mubarak.1
This article first presents a scoping of the youth
protest groups that sparked the January 25th
revolution and then discusses how these
movements organised themselves. It then debates
whether they represented social protest
movements or unorganised social activists who
were able to seize the spontaneity of the moment. 
This study relied on extensive interviews with
youth from different coalitions and movements
who played a key role in organising the January
25th uprisings and what followed in the ensuing
days and months. This is complemented by a
literature review that looks into both social
movement theory and the emerging scholarship
on the January 25th revolution.
2 The snowball effect
If we examine closely how the revolution unfolded,
we will discover that events were not pre-
orchestrated, nor were the steps that were trodden
pre-planned. Within the snowball, we saw ever
widening layers of people being drawn in. There
was a small bloc of politically conscious youth, the
core, which was later dubbed the ‘Facebook youth’
and which began to expand to include a second,
wider circle of apolitical youth who were motivated
by their own pressing social problems. The
politically active youth appealed to them by raising
issues that struck a chord with their daily lives,
such as the injustices they suffer as a consequence
of rampant corruption. The third circle comprised
members of the middle-class who were
increasingly squeezed politically and economically
and who joined in large numbers. The fourth circle
comprised members from the marginalised who
live on the fringes of society.
The demands of the youth organisers also took
on a snowball effect. They started with specific
grievances against the heavy security shackles on
society and the opposition to inheritance of the
presidency by Gamal Mubarak, and then the
ceiling was raised to urge comprehensive
political reform which then grew into one major
demand: the ousting of Mubarak.
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What helped keep the snowball in momentum and
in constant expansion were the reactions of the
government in its handling of the protests through
a fierce security response rather than a political
settlement. None of the demands articulated by
the youth activists and opposition were taken
seriously: the government and National
Democratic Party (NDP) officials repeatedly
stated that Egypt was not Tunisia (a claim later
repeated, mutatis mutandi, by leaders of Libya and
Syria). When the government chose to adopt a
political strategy of engagement after Tahrir
Square had been occupied for days, it showed a
complete disconnect with the level and scope of
opposition in the Egyptian street. Its own strategy
of engaging politically was discredited when it sent
its own thugs on camels to brutally assault the
hundreds of thousands of protestors stationed in
Tahrir Square, commonly dubbed the ‘Battle of the
Camel’, and thus convinced many more to join.
Strengthened by the signals from the military that
they would not strike against the people, the
political errors of the regime and the masses
flowing to public squares, there was nothing
stopping the snowball from getting bigger.
Sidney Tarrow defined social movements as
‘collective actions, based on common purposes
and social solidarities, in sustained interaction
with elites, opponents, and authorities’ (Tarrow
1994). Doug McAdam posited three components
vital to the understanding and analysis of social
movements: the nature of the political
opportunities arising from social and political
changes in institutions of governance; the nature
of the institutions and organisations developed
by the social movement; and the cultural and
intellectual beliefs and conceptions that bind
supporters of the social movement (McAdam
1999). One can distinguish two types of
movements based on the protest methods
employed in Egypt: protest movements that rely
on traditional means such as letter writing,
petitions and boycotts, and new movements that
have found a fertile space for activism in the
internet by developing these traditional
methods, creating e-mail campaigns to advertise
their activities, and using the technology of new
social networks to reach the largest number of
people (Earl and Kimport 2008).
This article will argue that the uprisings were led
by organised social protest movements that had
planned for the January 25th uprisings, and
which then through a snowball effect, took a
momentum and life or their own.
3 The social youth movements that sparked the
revolution
Since 2004, the Egyptian political scene has
witnessed the emergence of several protest
movements or political groups that have used
demonstrations as a principal mode of action
(Al-Banna 2011). Some, such as Kifaya (Enough),
the National Campaign for Change, the
Egyptian Campaign against Inheritance [of
Presidency] known as Mayoukomsh, Journalists for
Change, Lawyers for Change, the Democratic
Engineers group and others, we would consider
as elite-based groups that had limited
representation from the youth.
The other groups were more diffuse in power
arrangements and horizontal in structure and
they were more inclusive vis-à-vis youth. They
were essentially the ones that played the key role
in organising the January 25th uprisings. The
most important protest movements that called
for the January 25th revolution include: the ‘We
are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page; the Rasd
Network; the April 6th movement; Kifaya; the
Justice and Freedom movement; the National
Association for Change. The youth wings of the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic Front
Party, the Tagammu’, al-Ghad and al-Karama
also played a role and, with the exception of the
al-Ghad party, they all participated against the
will of the party leadership.2 There follows a brief
profile of the key organisers behind the January
25th uprisings.
3.1 The April 6th youth movement
This movement emerged within an extremely
volatile environment characterised by a flaccid
regime and the failure of political parties and
protest movements such as Kifaya to allure youth
to its ranks (Al-Sayyid 2008). In a bid to avoid
security harassment, the youth turned to
electronic space to engage, and it began to take
on specific youth issues such as protesting against
the rise in enrolment fees in the faculties of
engineering and medicine in 2007. The April 6th
group took on a public face in the third week of
March 2008, when it successfully used mobile
phones and the internet to call for a general
strike on 6 April 2008, through the ‘stay at home’
campaign (Hilal 2009). Most of the youth are not
affiliated to any one political party or force and
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have actively avoided adopting a specific ideology
in order to preserve its internal diversity,
according to its members. At the wake of the
January 25th strike, it had over 70,000 online
members.
3.2 The Hashd movement
This is the second youth protest movement to
emerge after the April 6th movement. A radical
movement that adopts a Leninist and Stalinist
programme, it is a wing of the Revolutionary
Socialists, which in early 2010, split into two
factions: ‘al-Hashd’ and ‘Socialist Renewal’. The
prime cause of the schism was the sharp
disagreement over whether organisation should
precede action or vice-versa. Members of al-Hashd
took part in the January 25th demonstration as
individuals, but the organisation threw its weight
behind the protest on 27 January.
3.3 The Justice and Freedom movement
Born on 21 July 2010, the movement had a
strong street presence, organising its first
demonstration on 23 July, followed by two more
protests on 25 and 26 July. It is one of the
strongest, most cohesive youth movements and
has suffered no post-revolution internal schisms.
It is a mix of liberals, leftists and large numbers
of independent activists, which has helped to
hold the movement together (Al-Qamash 2011).
The goal of the movement is to avoid the errors
of the Revolutionary Socialists and to be
ideologically as inclusive as possible. For this
reason, the name Justice and Freedom was
adopted: it is based on the idea of freedom and
democracy, in which all currents believe, and
justice, a principle upon which no one disagrees.
3.4 ‘We are all Khaled Said’
This group was formed on Facebook after the
death of Khaled Said on 6 June 2010 (Gad 2011).
Said was tortured to death by police, sparking
widespread protests that constituted an
important prelude to the revolution.3 The case
was not merely an instance of torture, but rather
the assassination of a citizen who insisted on his
right to know why security personnel were
violating the rule of law (Al-Ash’al 2010). The
‘We are all Khaled Said’ group includes members
of the coordinating committee of the youth
branch of the National Association for Change,
the Justice and Freedom movement, and April
6th (Al-Yawm al-Sabi’ 2010). The youth members
of the Facebook page come from different
classes, but neither they nor the leaders have any
specific ideology.
3.5 The El Baradei Popular Campaign
This campaign took shape even before the
National Association for Change came into
existence, in early February 2009 (Al-Shobaki
2010). A conflict split the members of the
campaign on 6 April 2010 due to a disagreement
over the movement’s priorities. The leadership
believed that street action should be calculated
and should only be undertaken with the
participation of prominent leaders like El Baradei
in order to give it more political weight, protect
campaign members and deter security pressure
as much as possible. The other camp, most of
them youth, adopted a different viewpoint
summed up in the slogan, ‘The Street is Ours’.
3.6 El Baradei Support League
The League grew out of the El Baradei Popular
Campaign after the split in the ranks in April
2010. The League was formed and formally
announced in June of that year after the two
factions reached a dead end, particularly after
League members objected to the decision-
making policy within the campaign, which they
believed was undemocratic and hierarchical. The
opposing camp at that time argued that the time
was not right to put all decisions before members
because it may open the possibility of security
infiltration. Many youth members of the
campaign were detained while distributing flyers
urging participation in the January 25th
demonstrations, as these members did not have
the experience of the April 6th movement or the
political savvy of the Justice and Freedom
movement in circumventing security apparatus.
4 From lobbying to alliances and organisation
within the square
This section addresses the following questions:
How was the call for revolution carried out? How
were alliances managed between old and new
protest movements growing out of the
revolution? How did these entities deal with the
lack of a unified leadership?
4.1 How was the call to the revolution organised by
social movements? And what was the relationship
between them?
Many young people carried the call for
demonstrations on January 25th from the virtual
to the tangible world, particularly those youth
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who belonged to social movements. Ahmad
Mahir, a founder of the April 6th youth
movement, suggested that their heavy online
presence had a significant role in disseminating
the call for revolution, particularly since the
movement has branches in 24 governorates and
operates in a decentralised fashion. On the day of
the revolution, youth with the movement took to
the streets before the appointed time, mobilising
in popular areas before heading to major squares
in various governorates. In Cairo, the April 6th
movement’s youth turned out in four groups and,
surprisingly, began the protest in popular
neighbourhoods (Mahir pers. comm. 2011). The
April 6th movement distributed massive numbers
of flyers – approximately half a million – and
focused on informal, popular areas (Al-‘Ishri pers.
comm. 2011). The slogans used varied but the
most effective were ‘bread, freedom and social
justice’ and ‘come down and join us before they
finish us’, and a number of other calls that spoke
to people’s violation of basic needs.
Youth groups on Facebook, most prominently the
‘We are all Khaled Said’ group and the Rasd
Network organised demonstrations on
25 January to coincide with ‘Police Day’, a
national holiday honouring an institution with a
long and generally dark history. About 18 months
prior to this, these movements had begun raising
awareness in the provinces and encouraging
protests against poor conditions in Egypt, the
regime and police abuse.4
Moreover, what strengthened the force of
January 25th was that the activists had
successfully managed to secure the participation
of the Ultras youth belonging to the two key
sports teams in Egypt, Al Ahly and Zamalek. The
Ultras were later to play a critical role in
securing Tahrir Square against the security
assaults and in particular, on the day of the
Battle of the Camel. Abd el Moneim Imam, the
coordinator of the National Campaign to support
El Baradei, at governorate level, said that what
made 25 January a possibility was that three core
movements (‘We are all Khaled Said’, April 6th,
and the National El Baradei Campaign)
synchronised and coordinated their activities at a
high level. Some young Muslim Brothers
responded to the calls to take to the street on
25 January, despite the Guidance Bureau
opposition to it. The secretariat of the group’s
student wing recommended that the Guidance
Bureau permit members of the group to take
part regardless of participation by other
members of the Muslim Brotherhood but the
director of the student wing, Mahmud Abu Zayd,
also a member of the Guidance Bureau, refused.
Later, a number of young Brothers met with
‘Isam al-’Iryan and reached a compromise,
whereby the organisation would not endorse the
January demonstrations, but any member of the
organisation maintained the right to participate
on an individual basis if he wished (Al-Qassas
pers. comm. 2011).
The young Brothers established a closed Facebook
page for Brotherhood youth, entitled ‘Word of
Truth’, and all the young Brothers who wished to
participate in the demonstration were invited to
join. The group coordinated with other
movements to make a strong showing on Arab
League Street in Mohandseen. In order to be able
to resist the security’s ability to repress the
demonstration it was agreed that the nucleus of
the demonstration would set out from a popular
neighbourhood near Arab League Street,
Imbaba’s Nahiya neighbourhood. The protest first
toured this area and managed to pick up
thousands of young people before heading to Arab
League Street, with a force too big for security
forces to disperse. They were joined by thousands
more youths who were waiting in the street as a
result of the publicly announced schedule.
Other demonstrations were arranged in popular
areas on 26 and 27 January and to mobilise large
numbers for 28 January, the Friday of Rage/Fury
protests. After the Muslim Brotherhood
announced they would participate on 28 January,
officials in the group’s administrative bureaus
and local branches coordinated to inform
members of the locations of the five different
demonstrations after more than 20 fictitious
locales had been announced on the ‘We are all
Khaled Said’ Facebook page to mislead security.
The demonstrations set out from five vital areas:
the Pyramids area, Muhandisin, Dar al-Salam,
Nasr City and Shubra, and managed to enter and
occupy Tahrir Square. Coordination among all
movements continued during the sit-in until the
formation of the Coalition of Revolutionary
Youth; the first body to call for a million-person
protest (millioniyya) in Tahrir Square on Tuesday,
1 February. The Coalition of Revolutionary Youth
was created in the square during the youth’s
occupation of Tahrir Square.
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After Mubarak’s departure, some youths began
to form new entities. Ahmad Mahir suggested
that the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth was
initially comprised of five protest movements, as
well as political forces and independents, but was
later expanded to include representatives of
political parties, with each faction given two
membership seats in the coalition. The young
Brothers were a major part of that coalition
(Al-Gawad pers. comm. 2011).
As for the Federation of Revolutionary Youth, it
emerged from the womb of the revolution.
Nevertheless, a great many of its members and
supporters had belonged to protest groups before
the revolution and joined the call for
demonstrations, printed and distributed flyers and
used Facebook to spread the appeal online (Hamid
pers. comm. 2011). The El Baradei Popular
Campaign and the El Baradei Support League
issued the call for revolution largely on the
internet and Facebook, in addition to organising
meetings in the provinces, raising awareness on
the street and drawing in activists during
signature drives (Sulayman pers. comm. 2011).
The call for demonstrations on 25 January 2011
issued by the April 6th movement was different,
as the movement urged all political forces to
participate. While youth social forces responded
immediately to the appeal, several political
forces and parties, particularly major ones such
as the Wafd, the Nasserists, the Tagammu’ and
the Muslim Brotherhood, preferred to wait and
see: until, by 27 January, they were certain it was
actually a revolution. These forces then seized
the opportunity, joined up and started to speak of
the movement as if they had created and
struggled for it. In fact, these parties initially
rejected the call for demonstrations and said
that they would not take part on 25 January
because it was a national holiday and thus
inappropriate for a protest.
Discussing relations with other protest
movements before the revolution, Muhammad
al-Qassas, a former member of the Muslim
Brotherhood and a member of the revolution’s
coalition says that the Brotherhood youth
maintained good relations with their peers in
other protest movements, such as April 6th and
Justice and Freedom, nurtured through
demonstrations, meetings, panel discussions, and
campaigns organised in support of certain
candidates during the 2010 People’s Assembly
elections, as well as over Facebook. This
encouraged the young Brothers to engage with
the calls to participate in the January 25th
revolution and coordinate meetings of the
various protest movements to determine
locations for demonstrations, the itinerary and
the starting time. Representatives of
Brotherhood youths consistently took part in
these meetings, and two or three meetings were
convened, in which young Brothers were involved
to coordinate actions and the slogans that would
be used, as well as to agree on a set of demands
acceptable to all (Al-Qassas pers. comm. 2011).
Abd el Moneim Imam said that the El Baradei
Popular Campaign mobilised its supporters in 20
governorates via Facebook and the distribution of
flyers. There was coordination between some
movements in the provinces both before and
during the revolution. For example, three
movements (‘We are all Khaled Said’, April 6th,
and the El Baradei Campaign) coordinated on
Election Day in 2010 to ‘make noise’, directing
people in the street or at home to honk their
horns or bang on pots and pans. This successful
experiment took place in 14 governorates. Before
the January 25th demonstrations, the three
movements coordinated efforts once again, to
identify locations for the demonstrations and the
meeting points in al-Mahalla, an industrial town;
Cairo; Damanhur, a town in the Delta; Alexandria
and Suez. In some provinces, Muslim Brotherhood
youth were involved in the coordination,
particularly in al-Mahalla; although some of the
organisation’s leaders objected that Sa’d al-
Katatni intervened to facilitate the coordination.
Nevertheless on 28 January, the ‘Friday of Rage’,
there was no coordination between forces and the
people who took to the street exceeded the
coordination capacities of the different protest
movements. There were massive numbers of
demonstrators wholly unexpected by the protest
movements. Attempts at coordination after
hundreds of thousands had gathered in Tahrir
Square were focused on harnessing energies and
dispensing advice to maintain the occupation. The
square was managed (coordination and
organisation attempts) from an operations room
behind the main stage and speakers run by the
Muslim Brotherhood. The room itself included
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
National Association for Change, the El Baradei
Popular Campaign, some independent youth and
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some national figures from the left. Another
operations room set up by Mamduh Hamza, a
world-renowned architect who designed the
Alexandria public library, involved the Coalition
of Revolutionary Youth, members of new
coalitions and April 6th. The political elite and
prominent figures met in other locations, such as
the clinic of Dr ‘Abd al-Jalil Mustafa, where food
distribution and other matters were organised
(Imam pers. comm. 2011).
Despite various organisational attempts, there
were disagreements between some new
coalitions, particularly during the days of
uprisings when negotiations with the regime were
taking place. This, then, was a political, rather
than organisational, dispute, and national leaders
intervened to resolve it (Imam pers. comm.
2011). Another group of youth said that two
weeks before the revolution, several meetings had
been convened to coordinate a draft of consensual
demands,5 particularly between the El Baradei
Popular Campaign and April 6th. In the period
before the January 25th uprisings, there was
division among different movements; however,
the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ page unified ranks
who began to coordinate for the event together
(Sulayman pers. comm. 2011).
With respect to the organisation of the square
and relations between protest movements during
the days of uprisings, Al-Qassas believes it is
false to claim that any one faction was in charge
of security in the square or shouldered the brunt
of responsibilities in the period from 28 January
to 11 February. Everyone worked with other
parties and strove for coordination, to secure the
square, establish the first broadcast system in
the square and provide blankets, tents and food.
This cooperation among young people was
facilitated by the unified nature of the demands
(Al-Qassas pers. comm. 2011). In order to
coordinate efforts, the Coordinating Committee
of the Masses of the Revolution was founded,
which included most coalitions and entities that
had been formed as of that moment, including
the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, the
Revolution Council of Trustees, the National
Association for Change and the Egyptian
Revolutionary Coalition (Al-Gawad Muhammad
pers. comm. 2011).
Shortly after the Coalition of Revolutionary
Youth was formed, a state of chaos emerged and
dozens of coalitions were founded. As a result,
April 6th left the coalition in April 2011 and
began engaging with other coalitions in
accordance with the new reality; it no longer has
any links with the Coalition of Revolutionary
Youth (Mahir pers. comm. 2011). It is
noteworthy that during the revolution, a youth
union was created within Tahrir Square, and
there was substantial cooperation between
movements that had existed prior to the
revolution and those that began to take shape in
the square (Hamid pers. comm. 2011).
In order to understand what happened in the
immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the
revolution, we can map the path of protest
movements over several, successive stages that
ultimately led to the desired change (Salim
2011).
First stage
This stage showed the importance of a strong
core advocating change and connecting through
social media, especially YouTube and Facebook,
with the goal of mobilising and attempting to
convey the voice and image of the protest
movement to the outside world. The success of
this tool for social communication and
mobilisation against the authorities encouraged
social movements demanding change to take
note. This space saw its broadest participation
during and after 25 January.
Second stage
This stage showed the importance of choosing a
time imbued with moral significance to successfully
mobilise against the regime. Egyptians chose
25 January as the date of uprising to correspond
with the national holiday for the police, who had
brought corruption and torture to the Egyptian
population. Concentration in one location was
vital, not only for the continuation of the
revolution, but for continued mobilisation
against the regime. Tahrir Square became the
Ground Zero for the protest movement,
constantly attracting more demonstrators – and
the demonstrators continued to stage million-
person protests.
Third stage
This stage showed the need to unite around one
slogan for change and clear, specific demands.
On 25 January political demands coalesced on
one objective: the ousting of the entire regime.
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Final stage
This stage showed successful fusing of doctrinal
and political contradictions into one mass to
show the strength of the street against the
political authorities. The Egyptian revolution
succeeded not only in involving young people who
were not political before the January 25th
movement, but also in dissolving the intellectual,
doctrinal, and even religious boundaries
separating various segments of the Egyptian
people. This process of increasingly drawing in
new segments of society and new forces in
support of the revolution created an enabling
environment in the face of the authorities’
violent security approach and several incidents
planned by forces that had an interest in
thwarting the revolution and staging a counter-
revolution. The solid core that led the revolution
for change in Egypt was relatively small and
could have been easily crushed if not for the
engagement and rallying of the surrounding
social environment that embraced the
revolution. Gradually, the regime began to lose
the street after various groups of regular citizens
joined the protestors, as well as professional
syndicates and trade unions, at which point the
call for change became a genuine revolution.
The precise method of confrontation was active,
peaceful resistance, not Gandhian passive
resistance. This awareness is also underscored by
the tactics used by the revolutionary youth, namely
congregating in low-income areas and middle-class
suburbs and then moving on to strategic positions
in public squares, in front of ministries and other
important governmental establishments.
4.2 How did the new revolutionary movements
organise and manage the coalitions in the absence of a
unified revolutionary leadership?
To answer this question, we can make use of actor
network theory, which first emerged in the mid-
1980s in the work of Bruno Latour (1987) and
Michel Callon (1986). This theory provides a
theoretical framework to study collective
technological–social processes. According to the
theory, the actors themselves grow and develop
within a network of relationships; they themselves
are a set of networks able to engage and overlap
with numerous other networks. In fact, we can see
this process at work in the formation of different
groups such as the ‘We are all Khaled Said’, April
6th, and youth with the Democratic Front Party,
the National Association for Change and the
Muslim Brotherhood. These young people
translated the theory into practice by building
new networks through a series of processes and
joint actions (demonstrations). The theory posits
that the links in the chain are related, making the
network manageable. This means that the direct
ties and relationships between young people and
various youth groups facilitated the management
of coalitions and coordination, compensating for
the absence of a leadership. According to this
theory, the new network binding the January 25th
youth acquired internal force, cohesion, coherence
(stability) and organisation (affinities) in the
absence of leadership, and the actors were thus
prevented from following their personal
inclinations (to become strong). The new network
recruited others for the network’s goals, utilised
the qualifications and motives of its actors, and
increased their benefit and functional importance
(Ritzer 2006).
Applying this theory to the January 25th
revolution reveals that the members of various
protest movements overcame the absence of
leadership via stability and unity within their
own movements during the revolution and via
ties and coordination with the other movements.
Thus, the January 25th revolution, sparked by
groups of young people, was a leaderless
revolution, joined immediately by large masses
without a unified leadership. It was a revolution
that was launched in a virtual space within a
network – the internet – with all its new tools of
communication: most importantly blogs,
Facebook, and Twitter, and then moving into
non-virtual society after the date and location
had been set (Al-Sayyid 2011).
Clearly, the January 25th revolution, made by
masses of people, did not have a defined
leadership or project. It was thus natural that
groupings and coalitions would take shape and
compete to fill a general political vacuum.
Because the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF) was relatively hesitant and slow
to make decisions during the days prior to the
ousting of Mubarak, these groupings acquired
greater significance, becoming pressure groups
that had an effective impact on achieving
important steps toward the demands of those
who turned out on 25 January.
However, not all coalitions should be put in the
same basket, insofar as they include authentic
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coalitions and interlopers with fictitious
identities. These distinctions permit us to avoid
generalising the term ‘revolutionaries’ and
applying it to everyone. There are numerous
questions about some of these coalitions and how
much of a consensus they represent. Some have
said that one person formed five different
coalitions using different names, all of them
revolutionary in nature. It is also not certain
about claims that some apparatuses aligned to
the former regime formed other coalitions to
serve their aims. Because the square was open to
all, it is entirely natural that anyone with
legitimate or illegitimate interests would
attempt to mark their presence with a coalition
to express these interests or a tent pitched in the
heart of the square (Huwaydi 2011).
During the revolution, no one can plausibly claim
that Tahrir Square had a leadership directing or
coordinating all the masses that came daily. In
the early period of the revolution, the most
pressing question was: What should be done?
What is the next step? The answer from some
activists was first that the occupation of the
square constituted an important means of
pressure that could not be ignored; thus, the
occupation had to continue. Second, it was the
people who had made the revolution and who
would preserve it. That is, ultimately the decision
would come from the masses (Yusuf 2011).
Muhammad al-Qassas believed a collective
leadership took tangible form in the coalition.
No one party had the right of veto, but rather
everyone had the right to put forward their own
vision. In fact, this vision was largely that of the
party or protest movement represented by the
member tasked with attending coalition
meetings. For example, before any coalition
member went to a meeting, he would poll the
movement or entity that had authorised him to
speak in its name. Al-Qassas also says that the
lack of a leadership was an asset, not a
disadvantage. It was for this reason that the
revolution was described as a people’s revolution;
it had no leader and no person could claim a
monopoly over it. Yet, the problem of the lack of
leadership was that it required extra effort to
coordinate among different factions that played
a role in the revolution’s success (Al-Qassas pers.
comm. 2011). The Federation of Revolutionary
Youth dealt with the lack of leadership by
agreeing to a rotation of internal positions
among members and the creation of an
executive bureau to give voice to the coalition’s
policies pending internal elections under the
group’s bylaws, as well as creating an executive
body in each governorate (Hamid pers. comm.
2011). From the first moments of the revolution,
the Muslim Brotherhood youth were in constant
contact with the group’s Guidance Bureau,
sending a delegation to maintain communication
on 25 January and inform them of the details and
arrangements (Al-Gawad pers. comm. 2011).
One segment of youth believed that one of the
most fruitful outcomes and strengths of the
revolution was that it did not have a unified
leadership organising its affairs. It appears that
young people felt they were capable of forging
their own future without recourse to the elites,
although they were consulted.
Another faction of young people believed there
was no specific leadership of the January 25th
revolution for several reasons. First, the
opposition under the old regime had never
agreed on a unified coordinating leadership.
Second, no figure in Egypt had emerged capable
of rallying people around him/her and there had
been no charismatic public figure for some time
(Al-Buhayri pers. comm. 2011). Third, operations
in the square were based on trial and error
(Sulayman pers. comm. 2011). Thus, some youth
believed that the absence of a unified leadership
was one of the major problems facing the
revolution, as a result of which numerous
attempts to coordinate various movements and
forces in the square failed (Al-Rubi pers. comm.
2011). To overcome this problem, young people
agreed on a voting mechanism to make decisions
and resolve disputes on visions and viewpoints
(Al-Ishri pers. comm. 2011). In contrast, some
youth did not believe the lack of leadership was
at all problematic, especially during the
revolution, because the demands were largely
unified in the square, summed up in the slogan
‘Leave’, demanding the fall of the regime. After
the ousting of Mubarak however, problems began
to emerge, particularly the issue of who
possessed the right to speak for all revolutionary
forces (Al-Khuli pers. comm. 2011).
4.3 Do the young people represent protest movements
or are they social activists?
The January 25th revolution was described as a
youth revolution because of the role played by
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youth forces in advocacy, preparation and
mobilisation, as well as the broad participation
by young people and the efforts of numerous
youth protest movements in the years leading up
to the revolution, which helped create a climate
conducive to the revolution. Regarding the
question of whether the young people who made
the revolution were part of protest movements or
unorganised social activities, young people who
took part in the revolution were themselves
divided, with three different viewpoints
prominent. Some young people6 believed that the
youth who made the revolution were social
activists and that the protest movements, the
Muslim Brotherhood and other youth forces only
accounted for 20 per cent of the protestors at
most, or 25 per cent during the Battle of the
Camel, administered from a tent in the middle
of Tahrir Square that maintained communication
with all the various coalitions, particularly in the
governorates. When communications were cut,
some participants from the Qalyubiya
governorate came to Tahrir Square on foot
(Imam pers. comm. 2011). In the first million-
man protest, on 1 February, it is estimated that
the Muslim Brotherhood constituted roughly
10 per cent, while political activists constituted
5 per cent and various protest movements and
parties another 5 per cent. This means that
approximately 80 per cent of those in the square
were non-politicised youth and people without a
leader or overriding purpose, moved only by an
Egyptian instinct for dignity and pride (Yusuf
2011: 97). This faction of youth believed that the
coalitions formed during and after the revolution
were dominated by members of protest
movements and some independents, particularly
the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, which
included representatives from organised protest
movements like April 6th, the Justice and
Freedom movement, and factions such as the
Muslim Brotherhood youth. It also included
independent political activists who did not
belong to a specific party or political formation
but were united by their dissatisfaction with the
country’s political and social conditions. This
included the likes of Nasir ‘Abd al-Hamid and
‘Abd al-Rahman Faris. This faction of youth
believed that the revolution was born in the
womb of a generation that dreamed of change
rather than reform. Some of them belonged to
protest movements, while others operated within
parties and others acted independently (Al-
Qassas pers. comm. 2011).
The second camp of youth believed that those who
organised and participated in the revolution were
a mixture of young people, non-politicised social
activists and young people who represent various
political and social movements (Al-Rubi pers.
comm. 2011), all of whom responded to the
demonstration appeals and actively participated
in the revolution. It was politicised youth who
were the most prominent due to their experience
and media relations, but many of them – indeed,
the vast majority – were apolitical youth. Evidence
supporting this shows that the largest number of
youth who died in the uprisings were independent
youth who were unaffiliated with any protest or
partisan movement (Al-Gawad pers. comm. 2011).
The third camp believes that the revolution was
sparked and organised by protest and
sociopolitical movements that existed before the
revolution (Al-Khuli pers. comm. 2011) and had
an organisational structure on the ground and
online. Young people with these protest
movements largely shouldered the burden of
calling for and making the revolution. Those who
then joined were largely regular citizens who did
not shoulder the same responsibility as protest
movements (Sulayman pers. comm. 2011). Some
young people note that given the lack of
leadership and organisation in the revolution, a
great many social activists who took part were
organised spontaneously and instinctually,
particularly when everyone felt the revolution
was in danger (Hamid pers. comm. 2011).
In the view of this author, Egyptian youth do not
possess a monopoly on the revolution, as all
segments of the Egyptian people took part. Yet,
youth were the fuel and engine of the revolution.
There are other youth groups that have no direct
links to political action, but they also
participated in the events, with or without the
consent of their leaders. This included, for
example, Salafi students, Coptic youth and the
Free Student Federation. Also prominent in the
revolution were large groups of independent
activists, such as Wael Ghonim, ‘Abd al-Rahman
Faris, Ahmad Duma and others.
Moreover, the January 25th revolution allowed
Egyptian young people and activists outside the
country to play a prominent role in the success of
the revolution. When the authorities decided to
cut Egypt off from the world in the early days of
the revolution by suspending internet access and
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mobile phone lines to prevent the mobilisation of
revolutionaries, Egyptian youth abroad
established a group on Facebook that monitored
developments inside Egypt and reported them to
the world. Much international and Arab media
depended on the group for news of events in
Egypt. The personal web pages of many of these
young people were also transformed into news
portals where stories and videos were posted, and
participants discussed and exchanged views on
the Egyptian revolution.
5 Conclusion
In sum, the January 25th revolution was made by
three major groups: (1) regular, non-politicised
Egyptians, who were the overwhelming majority of
the revolutionaries; (2) members of social
movements and human rights activists; and (3) the
army, which did not intervene to crush the
demonstrators, but rather maintained its neutrality
during the decisive 18 days. In line with actor
network theory, the youth struggled to establish
internal cohesion, overcome divisive inclinations
and focus on organising through different nodes,
which then took on the form of a network enjoying
high levels of synchronisation. Through the
nodes of the network there was mobilisation of a
wider circle of people, made possible through the
division of labour to expand outreach and then
transforming them into pressure points. Such
processes characterised the January 25th youth
agency within and outside Tahrir Square.
According to Gurr, political violence emerges
over three stages. It begins with a sense of
discontent, followed by attempts to forge this
discontent into political practices. Finally, these
practices are activated in the form of violence
against the political system, for example during
revolutions or general insurgency (Gurr 1970).
What happened in Egypt follows similar lines
with the politicisation of discontent across time.
This discontent quickly became an outright
revolution in all governorates around Egypt,
making it difficult for the security forces to
engage with demonstrators or disperse them
with force.
The slogans and ideas that circulated inside
Tahrir Square stoked Egyptians’ sense of identity
and deep connection by employing symbols or
slogans that encapsulated collective problems,
fostered unity, or encouraged struggle against
the existing regime. The revolutionaries used
the theory of relative deprivation – which posits
that there is greater potential for political
violence coming from areas or spheres with a
keen sense of relative deprivation, such as
crowded, poor urban areas – to identify areas
from which the revolution would set out. Some
protest movements such as April 6th started the
demonstrations from informal areas to mobilise
supportive masses. This indeed worked, and most
of these actions were spontaneous expressions of
anger. This helps explain the heavy participation
of some social sectors, such as the educated
middle-class, in the revolution, as these groups
consistently faced growing relative deprivation
throughout Mubarak’s rule.
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Notes
1 For more details, see: www.alraynews.com/
Papers.aspx?id=14071
2 Many young people who were interviewed by
the author agree on this, including Mabruk
‘Abd al-Wahhab al-‘Ishri, a member of April
6th and the Democratic Front; Sharif al-Rubi,
the founder of the al-Ghad party and a
member of April 6th; and Tariq al-Khuli, a
member of April 6th.
3 For more details, see: www.egyrev25.com/?p=323
4 For more information on the causes of the
January 25th revolution, see: www.egyrev25.com/
?p=323
5 The group included Tariq al-Khuli, a member
of April 6th; ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-‘Ishri, a
member of April 6th; Sharif al-Rubi, a founder
of the al-Ghad party, and Ahmad Kamil, a
member of Hamdin Sabbahi’s presidential
campaign.
6 Such as ‘Abd al-Rahman Yusuf, Abd el
Moneim Imam, Ahmad Kamil, Ahmad Mahir
and many others.
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